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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
Leon G. Pritchett, Administrator 
of the Estate of Mary H. Pritchett, 
Dereased, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
- vs -
Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance 
Company, a corporation 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
148765 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
ThiH is an action to enforce payment on a hospital 
msnrance policy. 
DISPOSITION lN THE LOWER COUR'r 
I 'laintiff was awarded $3,513.00 for medical and 
l111:-;pitn l expenses 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Reversal of trial court's decision. 
rrhe decPaSPd applied for hospital lJlHUranee fr0111 
Def Pndant insnrancf• company. 
On the application, dt>ceased intPntionall)· ornittPd 
and rnisrPpresented the state of her health and pm:1 
i llnPs~ws she had eontracted. 
ThP l)pfendant, rPlyinµ; on thP misrPpre:wnte(1 ;..'.dOrt 
stat1• of l1Palth, issuPd deceaS('d fnll im;nntlH'P <'OY<>rag1· 
llad tl1r• IJeft>ndant known thl' past eonditions and 
fH't•sent statl' of d<>eeased's !11-'alth, Defrridant \\'ould Jl(lf 
l1av<> isslwd tl1I-' sanw poliey hnt \\·oukl havl; <'lwng1·d 
thP tl'.l"lllS - prohalil>' h:,r issninp; a ri<l<>r ("~<·u1pti11g <'n 
tain illrn•ss<•s. 
Both th1~ d1•e1•as<'d and IH'rwf'i<'ian·, Plai11ti fl' lrnd 
knowlPdg-P of' tl11· rnisl'<'(ll'C'S<'nta1ions :ind in1l•Jld(·d i 11 
d<-•f'nrnd the DefPndant. 
'I'Jw dP<'l;asPd latPr di1·d fl'<l1t1 an afrlidio11 wl1i('l1 1!1' 
trial eonrt found not to he 1•mrnedPd with m1\· of' 111 1 
ilJnpssc•s s11e Jiad fail(•d to distln\'1'. 
3 
Defendant, learning of the fraud, refused to pay 
over the proceeds from the policy. 
The heneficiary instituted suit to recover. 
The trial court allowed recovery. It found that al-
though Plaintiff and deceased had defrauded the com-
pany, the Defendant could not prevent recovery because 
it had "unclean hands" since its application form was 
too brief. Furthermore, the trial court found that the 
Plaintiff's and deceased's fraud would not deny Plaintiff 
rPcowry since deceased did not die from an affliction 
~he failed to disclose: therefore, the fraud was not ma-
tPrial. 
On appeal, Defendant takes issue with both of these 
rn1wlnsiom; of law. 
ARGlTMEN"T 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE DENIED RECOVERY 
RECAUSE OF FRAUD. 
'l1he Plaintiff should be denied recovery because of 
i'1n11d and ~::n_19_,~ ['toh Code Ami. (Rupp. 1965) Rince: 
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A. "Unclean hands" is not a defense to the statut(' 
B. Assuming that it is a defense, Plaintiff is not 
entitled to it, because of his and deceased\ 
culpability 
C. Assuming "unclean hands'' def <>m;e is available 
under the statute, Plaintiff should Le denied 
this equitable renwdy sinee Defondant di<l not 
have "urn·lean hands.'' 
From the findings of the trial court, it is clear that 
Defendant made out a prirna facie ddense to th<' con-
trad on the grounds of fraud. Tht> trial court's s<>em1d 
finding of fad reads: 
"(T)he deceased and her husband knt'w at tlw 
time they made application for a health insuraiw1· 
policy that they had not made a full <fo;e]o:srn <' 
of all the facts." 
Finding Four reads: 
"That had full disclo.sure hPPn ma<ltt th<• cornpa11.1 
would ha.v<' attarhed a waiver for tl10 ( <fowlosed I 
disease.'' 
Finding ~even reads: 
''(A)ll penwn involvPd aded \\'itli a dPgn'<' 111 
intent to defrand as follo\\·s · 
A. The deceased and her husband deliber-
ately concealed the bad state of de-
ceased's health." (emphasis added) 
Clearly these findings constitute a prima facie case 
of fraud both at common law, Patterson Insurance Law, 
380-81, and under ~31-19-8, Utah Code Ann. (1965 Supp.). 
The remedy at Common Law is to allow the insurer to 
rescind the contract. Patterson sitpra1. Substantially the 
same remedy is given by Utah Statutes. 
Section :31-19-8 reads: 
"Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of 
facts ... shall not prevent a recovery unless 
(a) fradulent; or 
(b) Material ... to the acceptance of the 
risk ... ; or 
( c) the insurer in good faith either would not 
. have issued, reinstated, or renewed (the 
policy) at the same rate, ... or would not have 
provided coverage with respect to the hazard 
resulting in the loss, if the true facts had been 
known." 
'l'hus, any of the factors listt'd in subsections (a), 
( h) or ( r) will prevPnt a rerovery on the policy. The 
i'indinµ;s, quotPd ahove, show that all threp <'Xist. r(1he 
deceased and the Plaintiff, were acting fradulently 
(Finding 7, subsection (a)) ; the non disclosure was ma-
terial to the acceptaence of the risk (finding 4, subsee-
tion ( b)) ; and the insurer would have issued a rider 
had the non disclosed fact been known (finding 4, sub-
section ( c)). Thus, the first issue on appeal is what 
effect does "unclean hands" on the part of the insurer 
have (assuming for thP purposes of Argument I that 
the insurer had "unclean hands"). 
Under the statute, the only provision that requires 
good faith on the part of the insurer is subsection (c). 
The statute is written in the disjunctive; a finding of 
either (a), ( b) or ( c) prevents recovery on the con-
tract. Thus, under the statute the Plaintiff should still 
be denied recovery on thP basis of subst->ctions (a) or 
( h). Even under common law, the factor of "unclean 
hands" was not a defense. Admittedly, "unclean hands" 
was a defense in equity. -Whether this defense is avail-
able in an action for statutory fraud is qrn-'stionablt>. 
But assuming that it is available generally, it should 
not be in this case. The trial court found that the 
Plaintiff's also had "unclean handH." This faetor ha~ 
always been considered by equity courtH to prevent thP 
defensE'. ln fact, it has always bePn eonsidered a pre-
requisite before equity will act, that the party asking fot 
the equitable remedy, have "clean hands." 
Thus the court 8l10ul<l denv the Plaintiff's a n' ' - . 
covery smee they eommitted a fraud because'. 
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1. The defense of "unclean hands" is not available 
in an action on the statute. 
2. Assuming that the defense is available, generally, 
the Plaintiffs are not entitled to the equitable 
remedy since they also were culpable. 
Assuming that the equitable doctrine of "unclean 
hands" is available to the Plaintiff in this action, her 
n'covery should still he denied since the Defendant did 
not havP "unclean hands." 
rl 1ht' trial court found that the insurance company 
had "nnelean hands" because its application form \Vas 
too short. And this, according to the findings of fact, 
t-ncouraged incomplete disclosure; finally, this presum-
nhly, gave the Defendant knowledge of the concealment 
or omission and made Defendant guilty of "unclean 
hands." The Defendant fails to see the logic of tlte trial 
<' 1Jnrt's rei:;oning, and aI'f.,'1WS, that its judgment, as a 
niatter of law, should be n•versecl. The form that the 
DPf<·ndant insnranee company nses is no shorter than 
than most otlwr cornpanit>s. 1 f the nwre briefness of 
llie form waives tlw in:·rnrc>r's deft>nse of fraud, cartt' 
hlanl'lw aut lrnrity will lw gin'n to those applying for 
i1::;:.manee to commit francl. Thos1• who have already 
1'<11t1rnith•d fraud, to get lower premiums or to get unin-
,1irabl1· i11tnPsts insured \\-ill lw exoneratt•d from any 
c1iJpalJj]jty. rl 1 llOSC' JWl'SOl1S, who intentionally perpe-
l 1at('d a dc·eeit, will recover 
1'he size of the Defendant's form, if relevant at all , 
was sufficient for the medical history of most person~. 
How can it be, then, that this si7.e encouragPs franc!' 
DPfendant argues that it cannot. 
]'urtlwmore, Defrndant arglws that tlw mere si;w 
of a form rannnt, as a matter of law, <•neourage fraud. 
Admittedly, the wording in an appli('ation, may lw <·on-
ducive to inrorrect answers, hnt it takPs quitP a strPfrh 
of the imagination to hold that tlw size of tl1P blank 
spac<'S t>ncourages fraud. Eeonomy, botli in tnllls or 
1:·xpense and filing spac<', is undoubtedly th<> l'<'ason for 
thP size of thP DPf Pndant's form (assuming that tlk 
sizc> is small). 1"1hPreforP, unle>ss economy has somel1m1 
lw<'orne hla111e\\'orthy, tht> sizP of the form is irrdPv:rnt. 
POINT II. 
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE DECEASED'S CAN-
CEROUR CONDITION, PREVENTS RECOVERY 
UNDER THE INSURANCE CONTRACT REGARD-
LESS OF WHETHER IT WAS THE CA USE OF HER 
HOSPITALIZATION. 
Plain ti ff in his trial hr id's, argues that the ca us<' 
of death wa:-; not the non-disclosed earn-er, and il1Nefo1T, 
the fact of fraud was immaterial. lie eited l'toh ('odr 
Ann. ~31-19-8 (1965); and sevPral Ptah cases in point. 
lt was apparently on this basis that th<> trial eon rt l1<·ld 
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that regardless of the question of "unclean hands" De-
fendant was liable since the cancerous condition was not 
the cause of death and, therefore, the fraud was not 
material. 
Although Defendant is still of the opinion that the 
non-disclosed cancer caused the death, it is argued that 
thr cause of death is irrelevant. 
rl1he old statute was repealed in 1963 and the new 
provisions, changing the concept of materiality, is found 
in the 1965 Code Supplement. (See Utah Code Ann. 
~31-19-8 (Supp. 1965 compiler's note page 63). Under 
tlie new statute, subsection (a) \vill prevent recovery 
:-;imply if the appliration was fraudulent. Under sub-
st:•ction ( c) if the non-disclosed hazard would have made 
a ('hange in the poliry. The trial eourt found both of 
1 IH'se: that there was fraud and that tlw insurance com-
pany would haw attarhed a rider if it had knO\vn the 
C'oneealed eancProus condition. Tlw subsections new pro-
visions are in the disjunctive. Recovery will be pre-
Vt>lli!"d if t>ither (a(, (h) or (r) is found. Subsection (b) 
is r>one<>rn<'d with materiality. llowt>ver, th(_• makriality 
l'onnd tl!Prein is that the non-disclosure is material either 
11.1 tlJP imrnranee of the policy or the cause of death. lu 
I l1is <:asp the trial court found that the no.n-disclosure 
11 Hs n1aterial to the issuance of the policy 
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It may be speculated on ·why the legislature changed 
the old statute to omit materiality from subsection (a). 
Two possible reasons are quite evident. Ont• might lw 
the difficulty of proving the cause of death, as in thi~ 
casP. Defendant is still of H1P opinion that the cane('!' 
caused thP death. 'rhis is a question that doctor's miµJ1t 
argue about and the answer may nev<'r he proven cm1-
<'1usivt>ly. Court's are ill-Pquipp0d to dtit'ide such issues. 
Also, for instance, in this emw, tht.• non-(fo;closed cane<"!' 
might not have been the inmwdiatP eausP of death, but 
it could havP put thP d<•ceased's hod>· in :-;uch a condition, 
that she ·was unable to snceessfull>· combat the disPatw 
immediately causing the dPath. A seC'ond rPason for tJw 
l<•gislatnre's anwndment may havt• sirnpl.\· hPen to pre-
vent applieant's from attempting to dufraud insurance 
eompaniPs. Not only is tht· fraud an t>vil in itself, lrni 
it also ma)' incn .. as<' insnrane<' eost's to the genera] pnhh-
and it CPrtainly lt•ads to litigation. 1~!wse are tr:o pos:~:_ 
Iii<• motives lwhind thP leµ:islativ<· m11<·11<lm<'nt doing a\\':l) 
\\'ith matf·riality. 
b'urthPrn1ore, I)pfendant arg-ues tliat the fraud i~ 
rnaterial as r<-'qnirP<l by th<• old statntP regardlPs;.; of 
"·ltetlwr the rn~w statute r<•quires materiality. TJw rna-
t<·riality required hy the old statutP, as well as subsec-
tion ( h) of tl1e nPw statntP relatP tn a non-disclosed risk 
that wonl<l affrd tlw "a<·ePptaiw<· ol' tli<' hazard" eausim.! 
death. This is a misleading oJ' till· statut<-'. Th<• risk <11 
hazard~ spok~·n or in t!tf' old statuit• - - is to tlw int(•j'('o'1 
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being insured against. Thus, the risk, in this case, is 
death to the insured not merely death from a cause which 
was undisclosed. It is submitted that clearing up this 
ambiguity was, perhaps, another reason behind the 1963 
amendment. 
rrhe Plaintiff cited several cases to support his posi-
tion on materiality, hut after examination of these cases, 
it was found that everyone was or could have been 
dPcide<l ·wholly on the basi8 of no intent. In this case, 
the trial court found that the Plaintiff and deceased 
had an intent to defraud. In fact, all of the cases when 
dPaling with materiality speak in terms of either ma-
t('rial ity to the ri8k of mat<>riality to the cause of death. 
(In addition to the cases cited by Plaintiff, see Far-
1i11qfo11 11 (iranite State Fire l11s1tra11ce Co., 120 Utah 
109, 2;32 P. 2d 754. Thus, Defendant argues that Plaintiff 
~!iould lw denied recovery under either the old or new 
~tntnt<, but particularly in view of the changes made in 
the n<>w statute. See generally, Pattrrson, Essential of 
lus11rr111ce Law. 380-381 
CONCLFSION 
WhilP thP Dt•f(•JHlant sy111pathizPs with the Plaintiff, 
it <':lnnot be <lonhtPd that it was the Plaintiff's own 
1·1nH!nd, intPntional f'rnud, \\'hif'h !tas h<"Pn thP source 
1d tl1r> prohf<0 m. Jnsnrnnce cornpanie8 base their pre-
111i1m1s nncl eovPrage on nc-tuary tablPs showing expected 
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life under disclosed circumstances. Plaintiff, intention-
ally did not disclose one such relevant and material 
factor. Insurance companies cannot be expected to cover 
when there are such unknown, intc>ntionally concealed 
risks. Insurer's operate as a business, not as benefac-
tors that will pay regardless. If insurance companies 
are held liable in a situation such as this, undonhterll:· 
they "\\rill either go out of business or have to raise their 
premiums to ('Over slwh ('ontingent non-disclosures. This 
will obviously hurt the public in gc>n<'ral; those who arr 
healthy and who do not intentionally attempt to defraud 
their insuranct> companies. 'l1hus, the Plaintiff should 
lw denied reC'overy because of the intentional fraud. 
Hespeetfully ~rn bmittt>d, 
Ualen Ross, 
Mitsunaga and Ro.ss 
nn East South 'I1t>mp!P 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney /ur Def'endant 
